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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah

OscAR"~ .

.JloYLE AXD .JIAY P.

~{oYLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 6328

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR RE-HEARING

Comes now the appellant, Salt Lake City, above
named, and hereby petitions this Honorable Court for a
re-hearing and a re-examination and re-determination
of the issues presented by the appeal herein and of the
Court's opinion and ruling thereon in its decision on said
appeal. This petition is based upon the following
grounds, to-wit:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
The opinion and ruling of the Court are contrary
to the undisputed facts in the case and is wholly without
support in the evidence wherein the opinion states as
facts that Moyle "had other irrigation rights (that is,
water other than the 223;4 shares involved in this case)
which he used for irrigating his crops, and which was
sufficient for that purpose. The water right herein
involved '.was a right in excess of what he required for
irrigation during those years (1926-1939), which he could
have sold or rented had the City not taken the water."
1.

2. That the opinion and ruling of the Court are
contrary to the undisputed facts in the case and are
wholly without support in the evidence wherein the opinion holds fallacious the argument that because this water
was not turned into the City Conduit, the City did not
have possession thereof and states as a fact that "the
record shows conclusively that all creek water not diverted into the City mains under the exchange agreement
was used by the City in supplying to the Corporation the
volume of water it was obligated to supply the
Corporation.''
3.

That the opinion and ruling of the Court are

contrary to the undisputed facts in the case and are
wholly without support in the evidence wherein the opinion states as a fact that "after the City obtained the
order for possession, Moyles did not draw or use any
water represented by the water rights involved in this
action.''
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-l. That the opinion and ruling of the Court are contrary to the undisputed fads in the case and are wholly
without support in the evidence wherein the Court states
that · • the eYidence justifies the finding and con elusion
of the triers of the fads that the City had possession and
use of the water rights here involved during the period of
time involved in this action,., and said statement is
contradictory to the finding and state1nent in the opinion that during 1936-1937-1938, the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Cmnpany did not issue ''to Moyles a time or
turn ticket for the 22% shares of water here involved,
but distributed that tin1e and water to other stock holders
in the Corporation," which clearly shows that the City
did not possess the water during those years and that it
was the Cmnpany "\vho allowed some other stock holders
to use ~[oyle's water in those years

5. That the opinion and ruling of the Court are
contrary to the undisputed, facts in the case and are
·wholly without support in the evidence wherein it holds
as ''specious argument'' the point made by the City
that after the order granting the City possession, ~'[oyle
was still issued tickets by the water master for his irrigation turns the same as before the order, and, therefore, he
~~ o~Tle

\Yas

deprived of no water, and in concluding that

·was deprived of his water whereas the undisputed

facts in evidence show that Moyle not only

rec~ived

tickets for his water turns the same after as before the
order for possession, but he actually used the water

EO

ticketed to him for irrigation every season except the
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years 1936, 1937, 1938, when at his own request no tickets
were issued to him.
6. rrhe Court erred in holding that until the order
of possession was vacated and set aside, it became Moyle's
duty to exercise no control over the property (water)
and to not use the water, as such order of possession was
not self-executing and it was entirely within the right
of the City not to take Moyle's water at any time and
it was l\tfoyle 's duty in order to Initigate damages, to
take and use his water whenever the City was not using
it and it was made available to him for his use and benefit
both by the City and by the Ditch Company. The undisputed testimony shows that in three of the years on]y
creek water was turned into the Tanner Ditch and during all but a short period from July to October in each
year only creek water flowed in the Ditch and during all
of that time Moyle's water was available to him and
was ticketed to him in turns and was used by him. And
further, the only time "lake juice," as the opinion
euphemiously describes it, was turned into the Tanner
Ditch was during July, August, September, and part of
October, and if such commingling of water constituted
a taking pro tanto then the Court should have decreased
the judgment to reflect that pro tanto taking and not have
sustained a judgment for the full yearly rental value of
the water.
7.

The Court erred in affirming the judgment in

the sum of $4769.75 as included in said sum is the sum
of $350.00 awarded as damages accruing between the
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time of the comn1encing the action and the time of trial,
which award is not sustained or authorized by any supplenlental or additional pleadings and is not recoverable
in a law action, and for the further reason that such
damages did not accrue by reason of any taking of water
by the City under the order for possession as such order
was dismissed long prior to the filing of the complaint
herein and the rule of damages in eminent domain would
not apply to such period of time.
8. The Court erred in failing to hold that by reason
of plaintiff's failure to protest the application of Salt
Lake City to the State Engineer of Utah to change the
point of diversion of the water of the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch from the head of that ditch to the head
of the City conduit, and to appeal from the order of
the Engineer granting such application, the plaintiffs
are estopped to object to the City operating under said
exchange agreement and may not now recover damages
which result, not from the City actually taking plaintiff's
water, but from a carrying out of said exchange agreement.
9. The Court erred in holding that the corpus of
the water was the thing withheld from plaintiffs by the
City under the order for possession, whereas all that
plaintiffs were or could have been deprived of was the
right to use that certain quantity of water for culinary,
domestic, and irrigation purposes which the said

22~(±

shares represented.
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'

10. The Court erred in holding that tlie water right
which the City interferred with in this caRe was a right
wholly consisting of potable water even though it had
· been used by plaintiffs me~ely for irrigation purpo~es,
and that plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the basis
of the highest and possible use to which said water
could have been put under any possibility though different from the use made by the plaintiffs and in failing to
restrict recovery to the value of said water based upon
the character of the use to which plaintiffs had been and
were actually putting said water at the time the order of
possession was granted.
11. The Court erred in adopting and applying to
this case as the rule for fixing the measure of damages
the rule applicable to a case where the taking is a permanent one and involves real or tangible property which
has value and substance not necessarily based upon present use, whereas the property right here involved is a
right existing only by virtue of and based upon beneficial use, which beneficial use fixes both the character,
nature and extent as well as the value of the right or
property taken.

12. The Court erred in failing to hold that, during
all of the time complained of by plaintiffs, they did receive all the identical clear and potable creek water to
which they were entitled under their 22%, shares for
culinary domestic and stock watering purposes through
the pipe system installed under the exchange agreement,
and in failing to reverse the judgment of the trial court
for the reason that the amount awarded by the trial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
court includes damages for deprivation of the entire
quantity of water, including culinary, don1estjc, and
stock watering \Vater, to which plaintiffs would be entitled to under said 22% shares.

13. That the Court erred In concluding that the
assignments of error presented only two questions for
consideration of the Court, viz., whether the complaint
stated a cause of action and what is the measure of
damages, and in failing to consider and express its opinion on assignments of error as follows :
(a) ~-\ssignment of error No. XII wherein error is
assigned in the trial court entering judgment for the
return of 223;4 shares of water right in the Big Cottonwood Stream, when all the evidence shows that ~Ioyle
did not own any such shares of water right in the Big
Cottonwood Stream but only owned 223,4 shares in the
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch which in turn was entitled
to a certain. proportion of the Big Cottonwood Stream
and such judgment is predjudicial and n1isleading and
ought to ·he modified to state :Moyle's true interest.
(b) Assignment of error No. XIII wherein erro:
is assigned in the trial court adjudging and decreeing
that plaintiffs' water rights were the same water as
that decreed to Oscar W. Moyle in the case of Progress
Company vs. SaDt Lake City, and in paragraph seven of
the -decree in the case of Big Cottonwood TanneT Dttch
Company vs. Vincent Shurtliff as no such decree was
necessary to the determination of the issues of thi~ case
and there is no evidence to sustain such de termination.
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(c) Assignment of error No. XIV wherein error is
assigned in the trial court decreeing that the plaintiffs
recover from defendant the use and possession of the
water of Big Cottonwood Stream described as 22%,
shares of water right in said stream as plaintiffs own
no such right and it would be impossible to enforce such
decree or to know when plaintiffs were actually receiving the water to which they are entitled under the
shares involved in this action under that description
and to allow such fallacious judgment to stand would
be prejudicial and a source of confusion and uncertainty.
In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit that
this petition for rehearing should be granted and the
cause set for rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,
E. RAY CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Assistunts.
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
HOMER HOLMGREN hereby certifies that he is
one of the counsel for the petitioner named in the foregoing petition for re-hearing; that in his judgment ;:;aid
petitioner is entitled to the relief sought therein and that
said petition is well taken in point of law and in fact
and that the same is not imposed for the purpose of delay.
HOMER HOLMGREN
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REH.EAHING
I

GEXERAL

ST~\TEMENT

OF FACTS

Nince our petition for rehearing is directed to such
a large extent to what we claim to be erroneous fact conclusions stated in the opinion and since if such fact conclusions are erroneous there is no basis for the deci.;ion
as 1nade it becon1es necessary and extremely important
that the record be carefully and thoroughly reviewed in
this brief.- 'Ve realize this is repetitious but we earnestly
solicit the attention of the Court to this review for we
feel certain it will demonstrate the errors we have
assigned.
Ever since 1848 the water flowing in Big Cottonwood Creek has played an important part in the settlement and development of the Salt Lake Valley. In that
year the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch was constructed
to divert a part of the creek flow to supply water for
domestic and irrigation purposes to about 1800 acres of
land. The right to the use of this water continued in
individual ownership until 1903 when the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company was organized. All but a
few of the individual water users transferred their water
rights to this corporation and received certificates of
stock therefor. The articles of incorporation (introduced
in evidence as a part of the files in Case No. 31665, exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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hi bit C) provided for two branches known as ''~fain
Branch" and "North Branch." Under Article XXI, the
stock certificates must show on their face from what
particular branch or fork the owner shall be entitled to
water, and. he shall not be allowed the use of water from
any other branch or fork except that shown on his stock
certificate, and no stock holder shall, be allowed to transfer or sell any capital stock to another branch, ditch,
canal, or other conduit without the consent of at least tw0
th irds of the issued stock to the branch or fork from
which said stock is transferred as shown by the books
of the company.
1

In 1911 an action was commenced by the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company in ·which the right~ to
the use of the water in the said Tanner Ditch were adjudicated. The files in this action, Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company vs. Vincent Shurtliff, et al, case No.
14230, and in which Oscar W. Moyle was a party de-

fendant, were admitted in evidence in the instant case
as exhibit 2·. In that case in paragraphs 4 and 5 of tht
Findings of Fact (abstract, Page 87 and 88) the Court
found as follows:
''4th. That for the purpose of fairly, effectively and equitably distributing said waters to
the stockholders in the said The Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Company and owners in said ditch,
it has been the custom ever since the construction
thereof to distribute to each one his proportion
thereof by distributing to each one all of the
stream flowing in a branch or branches of sai<l
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ditch for a definitely stated period of tilne or a
definite fractional part thereof for a definite
period of thne, which said custmn is now and has
been a n1atter of necessary regulation in order.
that the said water nu1.y he distributed equitably
and be used beneficially.
''5th. That ever since the organization of
said The Big Cotton Tanner Ditch Company, the
Board of Directors of said corporation, by authority delegated to them by the stockholders of said
corporation and the owners of water rights in
said ditch who were not members of said corporation, have managed and controlled said ditch,
elected water masters, and thereby apportioned
and distributed the water of said ditch to the
stockholders of the said corporation and the
owners of water rights in said ditch who were not
stockholders thereof, according to their respective
shares therein, so as to secure a proper distribution and beneficial use of said waters.''
The evidence in the instant case shows without dispute that this same custom in management and di;;:;trihution still continues.
In 1920 Salt Lake City, being in need of additional
water fit for domestic and culinary uses, negotiated with
the Company to exchange water obtained by the City
from Utah Lake, and fit for irrigation purposes, for the
Cottonwood Creek water held by the Company, the Company to receive piped creek water for culinary and domestic use. Practically all of the stock holders of the
Company were willing and anxious to effect such an exchange, among other reasons, so that they could obtain
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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water, properly treated, in pipes under pressure for domestic and culinary use and an additional amount of
irrigation water during the late summer months when
the creek supply became low and inadequate. At that
time, Mr. Moyle was the owner of 2314 shares of capital
stock of the Company and he and a few others whose
lands were situated high on the Ditch, objected to the
exchange. However, the exchange agreement was duly
entered into January 2, 1920.
Under the agreement the Company transferred to
the City the right to take and use perpetually from Big
Cottonwood Creek all of the water of said Creek to which
the Company was or might be entitled, except 2.491
second feet during April, May, June, July, August, and
September, and 1.438 second feet during the other months
of the year, called "culinary water." The City agreed
to install a pipe line system and furnish and deliver
this culinary water pure and wholesome through such
system over the area served by the Tanner Ditch, a
very considerable system as shown by the agreement.
The City also agreed to furnish and deliver to the Company irrigation water during the months of April, May,
and June in quantity equal to the flow to which the
Company was entitled from the creek, and during July,
30 second feet, August, 28 second feet, September, 26
second feet, and the first fifteen days in October, 15
second feet. The water available to the City from which
to supply this irrigation water was Utah Lake water,
and this required the installation of a pumping plant and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pipe line to plunp the lake water from the City canal to
the head of the Tanner Ditrh.
Immediately upon the signing of this agreement,
the City comn1enced the work of installing the pipe line
systen1. finishing the line on 62nd South running in
front of :Jioyle 's ~i2 acre tract, in the fall of 1921. CI'r. P.
267-8) The pumping plant 'vas installed in 1924. (Tr. P.
266) :According· to :Jir. Towler, on July 11, 1928, l\fr.
Moyle ordered a one inch connection to this 62nd South
line and later, when this wooden stave pipe line was replaced by an iron line, ~Ioyle had this connection changed
into two one inch connections emptying into a two inch
line and also caused to be made four one inch connections empt)ing into a two inch line and a two inch connection en1pt~ing into a two inch line. (Tr. p. 278-79)
:Jir. :Moyle himself testified that he built his large two
story home on his property in 1923 and built into it l:Y2
inch pipes so water could be piped throughout the house,
upstairs and down stairs, the water coming fron1 the
main line installed by the City on 62nd South in front
of his place under the exchange agreen1ent between
the City ·and the Company. This first connection was
made in 1923 when he built his home (Tr. p. 84-85 ), and
consisted of two one inch connections to the wooden
stave line. Then he had another connection running to
some cottages. 'Vhen the iron main pipe was installed to
replace the wooden line, he had two more one inch connections made. None of the connections were metered
and he received culinary water therefrom without charge
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except the usual stock assessment levied by the Company
on its capital stock. (Tr. p. 86-87) He also had the City
install a two inch connection running into his property
but from which he has not yet used water. (Tr. p. 343)
Moyle has been using water from these connections, except the latter, for culinary domestic, stock watering,
and lawn sprinkling purposes since 1923, and he has even
used it to irrigate his orchard. In the face of
this acceptance of the benefits of the exchange agreement, Moyle
still was strenously opposed to the Company entering
into the agreement. In fact, in February, 1922, he filed
an action, in evidence as exhibit G, against the Company
to restrain the Company from delivering its water to the
City under said agreement clainring the Company had
no power to make such exchange, such agreement being
ultra vires. Instead of pressing said action to a conclusion, he has let the same lie dormant to this date,
electing in 1923 to build his pretentious home, connect
it and his cottages with the culinary pipe lines installed
under the agreement, ,and make every possible use of
the water which the City, under said agreement, had
chlorinated and made fit for human consumption and
placed in the pipe line system under pressure.

all

In addition, Moyle admittedly has used the irrigation water delivered by the City through its pumping
system to the company to which he was entitled under
his stock ownership in the company, which gave him
the extra water in the dry months called for by the
agreement.
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On February 13, 1920, after the exchange agreement
was entered into, the City filed with the State Engineer
of Utah an application to change the point of diversion
fron1 the head of the Tanner Ditch to the head of the
City conduit at the nwuth of Big Cottonwood Canyon,
all in pursuance to the provisions of said agreement.
Xotice of this application was duly published and no
protest was filed by ~Ioyle or anyone else. The application was granted September 3, 1920, and no appeal has
been taken by anyone from the decision of the State
Engineer. (Exhibit 3)
Under a decree of court In what is known as the
Progress Case, a water commissioner was appointed by
the court to take charge of all the water of Big Cottonwood Creek and distribute the same to the various
ditches, including the Tanner Ditch, according to the decree in that case. (Tr. p. 161) After the State Engineer
had granted the application for change of diversion,
(Exhibit 3) the water to which the Tanner Ditch was
entitled was diverted under the supervision of the water
commissioner at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon
in pursuance to the State Engineer's certificate, a point
above the point of diversion of the Tanner Ditch. (Tr.
p. 162) rA portion of the year the clear Cottonwood
Creek water would run into the Tanner Ditch and part
of the year there would be a commingling of both creek
and canal water flowing in the Tanner Ditch. After July
1, the Water Commissioner did not check as to the amount
of creek water flowing in the ditch as the City could
furnish canal water in specified quantities under the exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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change agreement. This change of diversion began in
1921 and has continued ever since, so that during the
four or five years before the order for possession was
obtained by the City in the so called comdemnation suit,
and during the time between the granting of that order
in 1926 and the dismissal of that action in J·anuary 1938,
and during the time between such dismissal and the institution of the present action, the diversion of water at
the City's intake up the Canyon has followed identically
the same pattern and procedure. The order for possesion in no wise altered or added to the methods pursued.
In fact, the water commissioner apparently knew nothing about the order for possession and always divided the
water according to the decree in the Progress Case under
which he had his appointment and by which his duties
were defined, except as modified by the order of the State
Engineer granting the change of diversion in accordance
with the exchange agreement (Abst. p. 114).
So far as the water masters appointed by the Ditch
Company were concerned, they divided and distributed
the water without regard to the order entered in the
comdemnation proceedings. George F. Smith, the water
master from 1923 to 1929, testified that while he was
water master in the early part of each season when there
was lots of water he just notified the users verbally when
to use the water. When it became scarce he issued tickets
giving the length of time they could use the water on
each turn. He issued tickets to Moyle for the use of the
water on the north branch. From 1923 to 1929 he timed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the ~~:;4, ~hares in the north branch outside the corporation to ~Loyle and he used it. (Abst. p. 136-137)
Horace T. Godfrey has been the water master since
February, l~l2~), to the present time. Each year he made
out water tickets as follows: On the. north branch, in
which branch ~Ioyle owned the 223,4 shares not represen~ed by stock in the Cmnpany, he issued and delivered
to ~Ir. ~[oyle water tickets each year covering these 223,4
shares and an additional 3~ shares representing stock
owned in the Company entitled to receive water through
the north branch, making a total of 26 shares all ticketed
on the same water ticket and handled without any distinction between shares outside and shares inside the
corporation. The ticket gave _Moyle the right to use
the full stream of the North Branch for the full tin1e
allotted to the total 26 shares shown on the ticket. The
only years in which he did not ticket these 223,4 shares
to ~Ir. :Moyle were the years 1936, 1937, and 1938 and
this omission was at Mr. Moyle's own request. However,
when he delivered the water ticket in 1936, he delivered
the same to _i\Irs. l\Ioyle, one of the plaintiffs herein, and
she wanted to know why there was a reduction in the
amount of water ticketed to them. Godfrey advised her
that l\f r. Moyle had advised him he did not want his
water out of the corporation timed to him any more.
However, in 1939, he issued tickets to Mr. lVIoyle for the
full 26 shares. Moyle used the water from the North
Branch on his place all of the time except the 3 years
above Inentioned and, in addition, on numerOUS occasions
Godfrey observed the water running from a 114 or 11;2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
inch pipe into a ditch in Moyle's property and also running on his lawn. During all of the time he has been
water rnaster, Mr. Godfrey also issued tickets to Mr.
Moyle for the corporate stock owned by him in other
branches of the ditch. During this time, no one has
changed the use of water from the North Branch to
other branches. (Abst. p. 126-133)
Exhibit 8 is a letter written by :Moyle to Godirey
stating the number of shares of corporate stock owned
by him January 30, 1936, and the name of the branch
out of which the water represented by such stock should
be taken. 16-1/3 shares were in the South Branch,
434 shares were in the Main Branch, and only 31;4 shares
in the North Branch. All of the water represented by the
stock other than the 314 shares in the North Branch was
by this letter directed to be delivered as it had theretofore
been delivered to tracts of land other than the 32 acre, or
home tract which was supplied from the North Branch.
He states in the letter as follows: "I desir,e this water
in the SIOVUth bnanch as heretofore to be allotted to my
ten acre piece, Pete Riva, and the water in the main
branch to my five acre piece, Pete Riva, the remainder on
my home place." In addition to this segregation of the
place of use of the water, Godfrey also testified that a
concrete division box has been in use which automatically
divides the steam so that 30 per cent goes to the north
branch and 70 per cent goes to the other branches.
Richard C. Towler, Assistant Engineer of the City
1n charge of the water supply, testified from definite
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reeords that in all the year~ from 1926 to 1939 there
wa::' ah,-ay::' ~onw creek water delivered to the Tanner
Ditch during the irrigation ~eason, except in 1936, between August 11 and October 15, when at times all
water delivered in the ditch was canal water while at
other tinws part canal water and part creek water was
deliYered. In the years 1927, 1928, and 1929, all of the
water supplied during the whole irrigation season was
clear creek water. In all of the years during the months
of April, ~Iay, and June and in many of them in the
month of July, all the water coming into the Tanner
Ditch for irrigation purposes was clear creek water and
at times even in the months of August, September, and
October the water furnished was entirely clear creek
water. It appears, therefore, that there was only a small
part of the irrigation season when there was a commingling of creek water and lake water in the Tanner Ditch.
(Abst. P. 139-141) It further appears from his testimony that in the year 1934, an extremely dry year, there
was more water delivered in the culinary pipe system
alone than the Tanner Ditch was entitled to under its entire decreed rights, and that had it not been for the extra
water which the Tanner Ditch obtained under this exchange agreement, the tree growth on Moyle's propert~- and all crops under the Tanner Ditch would have
died. (Abst. P. 144-147) ~Ir. Towler likewise has ob~erved that l\1r. Moyle used the water for irrigation.
A two inch pipe under 40 lbs. pressure, which was the
pressure in the main pipe in front of :Moyle's place,
would deliver 115,200 gallons of water per 24 hours. As
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heretofore pointed out, Mr. Moyle had three such connections to the culinary system.
The record is also conclusive that after the exchange agreement was entered into and after the culinary pipe system was installed there was no attempt
on the part of t~e Company to time or ticket or control
the use of culinary water drawn from the pipe system.
No meters were placed on these pipes and no account
was made as to the quantity of water drawn by those
using the culinary water. The tickets issued by the water
masters above referred to relate only to the water turns
for irrigation. The amount of water which a water user
would or could use from the pipe system was entirely
within the control of the user himself. The court in Case
of Big CottO'YIIWIOIOd T~anner Ditch Co. vs. Shurtliff, .et, al.,
No. 14230, exhibit 2, to which Moyle was a party, entered the following conclusion of law:
"20th. That on said ditch there is no such
thing as a culinary right, domestic right, stock
watering right, fish right, or power right separate and distinct or different from an irrigation
right, but that all of such so called rights are
Inere uses to which the various owners of rights in
said ditch have applied the shares of water to
which they are respectfully entitled.''
The court also entered the following conclusion:
'' 23rd. The Court further finds that the
plaintiff (Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company) is entitled to a decree enjoining and restraining all of the defendants in this action (including :Mr. Moyle) from interferring with the
distribution of the water of the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch in accordance with the rules and
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regulations adopted fron1 thne to time by the
owners of the water rights of said Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch.''
By the construction of the culinary pipe system the
users of water, both under stock ownership and under
shares outside of the corporation, were supplied with
water for their culinary, domestic, and stock watering
purposes, which the Court concluded as a matter of law
in the case Exhibit 2, as heretofore quoted, were simply
uses attached to the irrigation right and not separate
and apart from the irrigation right.
Since this culinary water pipe system made water
available in continuous flow during the whole of the
year for culinary, domestic and stock watering purposes,
the conclusion of the Court in the case above referred to
the effect that such regulations should be adopted as
would enable the water users to receive as near a continuous flow as reasonably possible in order that they
might have water for culinary, domestic, and stock watering purposes was completely complied with. So far as the
water users on the Tanner Ditch were concerned when
that pipe system was installed, there only remained the
matter of distributing water for irrigation during the
irrigation season and this was taken care of as testified
to by the two water masters.
That the pipe system was designed to and does
carry the culinary water to users on the Tanner Ditch for
shares outside the Tanner Ditch Company is evident
from the testimony of Moyle himself. He testified he
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asked the City to put in a two inch pipe connection
with the 62nd South Main, which was done. It extends
about six inches inside his fence. While he says no
water was actually drawn from it, he nevertheless testiified ''I .expect t1o use it when I g1e.t my wat.er back.''
(Tr. P. 373) Mr. Towler testified it has a valve on it
which, if properly turned, keeps the water from flowing out. It would also follow that, if turned the other
way, water would flow out. (Tr. P. 295) The opening
is there, and, according to Moyle's counsel, connection
can be made thereto at any time. How Moyle expects
to get his water hack and delivered to him in the pipe
line installed under the exchange agreement without
becoming a real party, and submitting himself and all
his rights, to such agreement is not explained. This
intention to use the water through the pipe line was
evidenced in 1934 in which year the connection was made.
It is indisputable evidence also that Moyle would be
perfectly agreeable to having the culinary and domestic
water to which he was entitled under his 223A shares
outside the Company delivered to him in the pipe line,
and that he was prepared to take that water through that
very identical connection. By the City making that connection and leaving it in such condition that Moyle could
draw all the water therefrom that such connection would
deliver, viz., 115,200 gallons per day, was tantamount to
a direct tender to him of water to that extent. In the
face of such a situation, how can it be said that the
City had possession of all his water and refused to permit him to use it~ And furthermore, he had two other
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ronnection~.

one consisting of four one inch connections
emptying into a two inch pipe, and another consisting of
two one inch connections emptying into a two inch pipe,
( Tr. P. :279) each capable of delivering a like amount of
water each day, and from which connections he admittedly used "·ater. There is not the slightest evidence that
he could not or did not procure all the culinary and domestic water to which he was entitled under all his shares
both in and out of the corporation from these two connections. ~-\.s a rna tter of fact, he himself testified ( Tr. P.
:3-!-!) that he might have used the water he had both in
the corporation and outside the corporation from the
pipe lines. He admits there were no meters on any of the
lines so there was no way of telling ho\\· much water he
used. The important fact, however, is that the City permitted him to make these connections and made available
to him the enormous total of approximately 445,000 gallons of water per day had he chosen to draw from such
connections. The fact is that he had it within his power to
use the quantity of water which those connections were
capable of delivering. He himself testified (Tr. P. 86-87)
that he was inclined to think that all three connections
were put in at the same time and that he has had the
three connections from the time he built his house.
Edward C. Bagley testified that he leased 40 acres
of land adjoining Moyle's home place on the West for
eight years prior to the trial. On the North branch, the
users take the entire stream of that branch during water
turns. He would have to go each turn to Moyle's place
to get his water, he being the next user below. On each
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occasion during the eight years when he went to get
his water, it would be diverted onto Moyle's land. Before he leased this property adjoining Moyle's, he quite
often had to go to l\1oyle 's place to get the water for
his own land, and on those occasions he would find the
water turned onto Moyle's place. The water has been
turned onto Moyle's place into his ditches ever since
Bagley lived in that vicinity, a period of more than
thirty years. (Abst. P. 117-119)
As shown by Towler's testimony above referred to,
during the period from 1926 to 1939, there was only a
very short time in one year, viz. 1936, when creek water
was not turned down the Tanner Ditch. Under the exchange agreement, so far as the Ditch Company and its
stock holders were concerned, the City was not required
to turn down any creek water into the ditch, hut could
supply all water from its lake water, the culinary and
domestic uses being taken care of by the pipe lines.
When it did turn down creek water each year, except the
short period in 1936, it follows that it did not take possession of or keep Moyle's creek water. The evidence is
without dispute that the City turned down creek water
which, with the canal water, supplied the Company with
a total quantity sufficient to give Moyle and all water
users all the water his and their rights entitled him and
them to. This is true because the Company every year
ticketed Moyle his full rights in the Ditch under the
various branches. He, himself, testified ( Abst. P. 34) ''I
a-rn inclined to thimk that immediat,ely after this oondemnat~on suit the. wat.e.r mast,etr oonti'YlfU)ed to give me
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the trat.er that 'lras condemned.'' He further testified
he told the water master he had no water but he was
not able to state whether it was one, two, or three years,
or when it was after the condemnation suit that he so
informed the water master. (Abst. P. 35) Mr. Godfrey,
the water master, testified it was in 1936 that Moyle
told him he wasn't entitled to the water, so according,
to his own testimony, the water master continued to
give him the water that was condemned until1936. This
water was not delivered to him in the years 1936, 1937,
and 1938 at his own request, as heretofore pointed out,
but it was again delivered to him in 1939 after the condemnation suit was dismissed. He also testified that
it was the custom for him to take his water at the time
designated on his water tickets and to keep the water
until the time shown on the tickets expired and the next
user came and took it. (Abst. P. 45-46) While he disclaimed ever using what he called mud~y water, which
according to the evidence was only delivered in parts
of the months of July, August, September, and October,
and sometimes was not delivered at all during the entire
season, whenever the clear creek water was delivered he
used it and would just let the water run until the other
fellow came and took it.
If the Company had the full quantity of water to
which the Tanner Ditch was entitled, being a combination of creek and canal water, it cannot be said that the
City had or kept possession of Moyle's water. All Moyle
could object to was a commingling of the creek water
with the canal water, which thereby decreased the quality
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of his creek water, a condition which might be inherent
in the operation of the exchange agreement, but which
certainly could not be held to be the equivalent of a
taking and possessing by the City. Moyle himself recognized that his proper remedy was against the Ditch Company to prevent it from exchanging the creek water
under the exchange agreement, and he commenced an
action to that end in 1922, which is in evidence as exhibit
G. The City did not enter into that controversy, though
an order was entered requiring Moyle to make the City
a party. J\1oyle permitted that suit to lie dormant so far
as making the city a party and four years later the
City brought the condemnation suit and obtained an
order for immediate possession. But, it should be kept
in mind, that such order was not self executing-even
with the order the City could, and by all the evidence did,
continue to let creek water run down in the Tanner Ditch
all of every irrigation season except 1936 as heretofore
indicated. During the remainder of every year, creek
water alone was available to the North branch users
either in the ditch itself or in the pipe lines to the full
extent of their water rights.
Certainly, simply because the City had obtained a
Court order giving it permission to take possession, did
not mean that the City was compelled to take possession
nor did it prevent the City from turning down creek
water whenever it so desired. The order for possession
was 1nerely permissive and whether it was availed of
would be a matter of proof and the proof all ·shows, as
we have demonstrated, that the City did not elect to
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take exclu~ive and entire possession of all the creek
water to which the Tanner Ditch was entitled.
The burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs to show
that the City had in fart taken actual possession of all of
the water to which plaintiffs were entitled under their
22~~ shares. The procurement of the Court order giving
the City immediate possession was merely proof of intention to take possession and legal sanction for the taking; but it did not accomplish the taking and possessing.
That could only be done by the City actually diverting
all of ~Ioyle's water into its conduit at the mouth of
the canyon and in not permitting any of it to reach the
~orth branch diversion box. Instead of producing testimony to prove such diversion, ~Ioyle, himself, testified,
as above shown, that the water masters continued to
supply him the condemned water for several years, and
according to Godfrey ten years, after the order giving
possession was granted and the only year when this
water was not supplied were the years that Moyle specifically requested the water master not to deliver it. All
that :Moyle testified to was that he refused to use the
"muddy" water. He had no hesitancy in using all the
piped water he wanted; in fact he built his pretentious
home only when assured the piped water would be
available. He always used the creek water when it was
not commingled with the lake water. He uBed that water,
according to his own testimony, as specified in the
turns allotted to him in his water tickets. Those tickets
specifically fixed the turns covering the, very 22% shares
\vhich he had the burden of showing the City took away
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from him. That the water masters ticketed to him this
water; that the water was available in the north branch
for his use; that he used water according to his ticketed
turns; all this is not only undisputed, but it is testified to
by himself. In the face of all this his inconsistent statenlent. by way of a conclusion that he tried not to use
the water represented by these shares and thinks he did
not use it can have no weight as evidence. When the condemned water was made available to him each year, he
claims he informed the Company he would not have
it because it was condemned, but he nevertheless took
and used it both through the pipe system and through
the open ditch.
It might be said that the water used by him on
his home tract of 32 acres was only water to which he
was entitled under his stock ownership. We confidently
assert that there is not a scintilla of evidence to support such a position. The facts we have already referred
to disprove it. Under the articles of incorporation of the
Ditch Company, he could not transfer to the north branch
any water from the main or south branches without the
consent of the other stock holders. There is an entire
absence of proof of such consent and Godfrey testified
no transfer was made. Moyle's own letter, exhibit 8,
shows that all his rights under his stock ownership, except 31,4, shares, were specifically alloted to the main
and south 'branches in which they were issued. All these
main and south branch shares had been and were to
be used by Moyle's own direction by Pete Riva on the
10 acre and 5 acre tracts. The 3~ shares were the only
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stock shares that could be used to supply water to the
home tract. If ~Ioyle had lim.ited his use of water on
this tract to the rights represented by these 314 shares,
it would have been very siinple for him to have testified
that while he was ticketed for 26 shares he in fact used
water only that fractional part of the time which the
311~ shares represented on the tickets, to wit: 3% over
26, or Ys of the time allotted. Instead of so testifying,
he testified he used his turns at least when creek water
was available and let it run until the next user (who was
Bagley) came and took it. As to the culinary water, he
had no way of knowing when he had used his 314 shares
worth, and even admits that he may have used n1ore
than his stock ownership entitled him to.
In the light of the foregoing analysis of the record,
we shall proceed to advert to the specific grounds for
rehearing stated in our petition.

GROUNDS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
The majority opinion makes the following statement: "The point is urged that after the order granting
the City possession, Moyle was still issued tickets by
the water master for his irrigation turns the same as
before the order and, therefore, he was deprived of no
water. This is specious argument. He does not sue for
crop damage for lack of irrigation water. H·e had other
ir.rigation wat1er rights in the Big OoUonwood Tanrner

Ditch which he us,ed for irrig,atitn.g his crops, and which
was sufficient for that purpose. The water right hereim
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imvolved was a right in .exoess of what he requir,ed for
irrig,ation d"Uring those yeo.lfs, a(fl.d which he could have
sold .or 'tiented had the City nJot t·aken the W!ater. '' The
following points are thus asserted and relied upon in the
affirmance of the judgment: (1) That Moyle is not
suing for crop damage for lack of irrigation water,
because (2) he had other irrigation water sufficient for
the purpose. ( 3) The water right taken over by the
City was in excess of what he required for irrigation
during those years (1926-1939) : and ( 4) this excess
water he could have sold or rented if the City had not
taken it.

Because this view of the record must of necessity
had such an extremely important bearing on the decision reached and because such view is wholly untenable
we feel bound here to refer again to the matters and
record already reviewed.
In his complaint, Moyle alleged that these 22%,
shares of water right were at all times complained of
appurtenant to his land in the Southeast quarter of the
Southeast quarter of Section 15, which was this 32 acre
horne tract. Such a right could only come into being
and continue to live and exist as an appurtenance to
that land because the water represented thereby had been
and was being put to beneficial uses upon the same.
:Moyle testified the he required this water to irrigate
this tract, not for the purpose of raising farm crops it
is true, but for the purpose of irrigating the native trees
and shrubs which covered approximately half of this
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tract, and in addition to irrigate his orchard, pasture,
lawn, and grass, and to beautify this tract, and that
it was because the City by the order of possession pre-

Yentecl a continuation of such use that he brought this
action. Here is a summary of his testimony: The

22%~:

shares were appurtenant to this tract. (Tr. P. 57)

He

used all this water both that that is in the corporation·
and that that is out of the corporation on this property
and other property. (Tr. P. 63) On the 32 acre tract
he used part water represented by stock and the rest
by shares outside of the corporation. (Tr. P. 65) That
part used was allotted by the officers of the Ditch
Company and they allotted both the stock shares ( 31,4
shares) and the 2234 shares on the same ticket. When
asked what use he made of that water, he testified: "I
used it almost all the time on these 32 acres. (Tr. P. 66)"
During all the years prior to 1926 he put all this water to
use on his home tract, on his orchard, trees, in front of his
house, and on shrubs and bushes, and for beautification.
(Tr. P. 90) His land was not adapted to farming so
he used all his water for trees and beautification. (Tr.
P. 109) Prior to 1926 it was his custom to use his water
to irrigate trees, grass, shrubs, garden, alfalfa, and to
beautify the place. (Tr. P. 142) He ran a ditch frorn
the Southeast corner of this tract North along the East
side and then Westerly. Another ditch was run West
from this ditch at about the center of the East line to
water ground planted to oats and alfalfa. It would likewise carry water to the trees. More than half of this
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tract was covered with trees. Then he took a ditch out
of the North Branch running Northwesterly South of
his house from which he irrigated half an acre and also
the orchard. He also had 2 acres where he grew a garden
and some fine strawberries. He also had a clover patch
and some pasture land which he irrigated. All these
areas he irrigated before 1926. After that one of the
ditches and pipes were abandoned. The ditch he refers
to isn't clear in the record, but the ditch is still there
but hasn't been used, except in the spring a little water
comes drown from the Judge property ditch. (Tr. P.
331-342)
Such was the user, testified to by Moyle himself,
that preserved this water right as an appurtenance to
this 32 acre tract. That he considered all the water
represented by those 22% shares was necessary to properly irrigate that particular tract, being a ''gravelly
soil," is borne out by the foregoing testimony and further by :Moyle's answer in the action in evidence as exhibit 2, the Shurtleff Case, wherein he claimed that in
addition to the 22% shares he and his predecessors
since 1893 had beneficially used for irrigation purpose,
a stream of water running ten inches deep and 2;/z feet
wide four days a week to produce crops on this 32 acre
tract. There is not the slightest evidence that suddenly
and without any apparent reason in 1926 Moyle had
no need for this water represented by these 22% shares
to irrigate this tract or that he had other water rights
on the ditch which he used for irrigating this land which
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bered that under the articles of incorporation he could
not use the corporation stock water rights to irrigate
this land without tlw consent of the other stock holders,
and the eYidence is that no transfer or use frorn one
branch to another was Inade. By his own direction, as
shown by exhibit S. he was using all his other water
rights on his ten acre and five acre tracts which left no
water to irrigate the 32 acre tract except that represented
by 3~,~ shares of stock and the 22% shares, and it is
without dispute that the water master ticketed his other
shares of stock in the Company to the South Branch
and the ~[ain Branch.
Likewise, there is absolutely no evidence to sustain
the statement that these 2234 shares represented water
in excess of what was required for irrigation during
the years 1926 to the time of trial. If it was excess water
in 1926, how and when did it become such 1 If it was excess water then, it must have always been excess water
unless some special conditions intervened and there
is no testimony of any changed conditions. Certainly
it did not become excess water because the City obtained
the order of possession. It could only become excess
water because ~Ioyle no longer had use for it for irrigation purposes on this 32 acre tract. But the testimony,
as reviewed, shows that Moyle claimed he used it all in
the years 1921 to 1925 inclusive, the years the exchange
agreen1ent was effective before the order of possession
was granted. It also shows he claimed he used it all during all the years prior thereto since he owned the place.
There is no evidence at all that in 1926 or any other
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time he decided to discontinue use of this water for irrigating this tract. The evidence is that his water tickets
covered these shares for irrigating this tract and no
other tickets were issued for this tract. If the evidence
did not show a user for irrigation purposes during those
years since 1901, when he acquired the property, to
1926, then it must follow Moyle had no irrigation rights,
for it is only by use that such rights continue to exist.
Furthermore, the statement by the majority opinion that the water right involved was a right in excess
of what was requjred for irrigation, he having sufficient other irrigation water for his crops, which excess
he could have sold or rented had the City not taken the
water, completely ignores the culinary and domestic
rights which these 22%, shares represented. It must be
assumed that the excess water was the water represented
by those shares. According to the testimony, the culinary
and domestic rights constituted a very important part
of the water rights represented by these shares and
were important in fixing the rental value thereof. Does
the majority opinion mean by this language that what
the City took was only the excess irrigation water for
which Moyle had no need during the years covered by
the order of possession and that Moyle must have received his culinary and domestic water~ If so, then
the City did not take possession of his entire rights
represented by these shares and the case should be reversed, because the judgment of the trial court is clearly
based upon the proposition that Moyle was completely
dispossessed of all rights represented by these shares.
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The rnajority opinion next sweeps aside the contention of the City and all of the eYidence hereinbefore
reYiewed to the effeet that the City did not actuall~,
take ~[oyle ·~ \Yater ~inee ereek water was actually furnished to the Tanner Ditch at all times in every year,
except a short time in 1936 and during smne years ( 1927,
l~l2S. 1929) no lake ,,,ater at all \Yas in the ditch, by the
simple process of postulating that "if the City used
this ~Ioyle ·water as part of the water it delivered to the
Corporation under the exchange agreement it had possession of it.~' The opinion further says that the record
conelusiYely shows that all creek water not diverted
into the City ~Iains under the exchange agreement was
used by the City in supplying the Corporation with the
volume of water it was obligated to supply to the Corporation. On the contrary, we respectfully submit that
there is absolutely no basis in the record to assurne
that the City furnished the Jioyle water to the Corporation to make up the water it was bound to deliver to the
Corporation under the exchange agreement. This is indisputably true because, in the first place, the City was
obligated under the exchange agreement to deliver to
the Corporation only the same quantity of water the
Corporation, as such, was entitled to in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch, plus the bonus water in the dry
months. The Corporation had no interest in or right to
that quantity of water represented by Moyle's 223;4
shares outside the Corporation. It did not exchange that
quantity of water nor did the City undertake to deliver
to the Corporation water in lieu thereof. When the City
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furnished that quantity of water to which the Corporation was entitled, it fully discharged its part of the
agreement.
In the second place, there was actually delivered
into the Tanner Ditch not only the quantity of water
to which the Corporation as such was entitled, but there
was also delivered therein an additional quantity at
all times sufficient in amount to supply 1\1oyle all the
water represented by his 22%, shares. This is demonstrated beyond all cavil by the fact that the Corporation ticketed this water to him and assigned to him the
turns in hours to which those shares entitled him and
the water was there flowing in the ditch during those
hours. This occurred every year except 1936, 1937,
1938 when by Moyle's own request this water was not
ticketed to him, but in those years, this water was delivered into the ditch and was used by James H. Moyle.
Furthermore, the exchange agreement was in effect four
years before the order of possession was obtained and
the delivery of canal water occurred two years before
that order was granted. And during all these years :Moyle
got his water. This conclusively shows that the City
did not need and was not using Moyle's water to supply
the corporation with the water contemplated by the
exchange agreement.
In the 3rd place, the majority opinion itself contradicts its own statement above referred to when it
goes on to say that during the years 1936, 1937, 1938,
the ''Corporation did not even issue to Moyles a time
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or turn ticket for the 223,4~, shares of water herein involved, but distributed that ti.me and wat,er to other
stock holders in the Corporation.'' If the Corporation
distributed this water to some other stock holders then
the City must not have retained possession of it, but on
the contrary must have supplied it to the Corporation in
the ditch. If the Corporation had the water represented
by these shares available for distribution during those
three years and did actually distribute it to someone
other than ~Ioyle, then, of course, the City must have
supplied more water than that necessary to meet its
exchange agreement and did not use Moyle's water
to make up the quantity it was bound to furnish to the
Corporation as such under its agreement.
Furthermore, the opinion entirely omits to state
that the reason this water represented by the 2234 shares
was not ticketed and distributed to Moyle was because
he expressly instructed the water master, Godfrey, not
to issue him a ticket for or distribute to him this water
during those years. (Tr. P. 230) The water was used
by his brother, James H. }foyle and was again ticketed
to plaintiff in 1939 on direction of Henry D. Moyle,
director and attorney for the Corporation. Some of
the water tickets issued to Moyle are in evidence and
show conclusively that his full water rights were available to him. He claims he did not use it and the Court
apparently chooses to believe this even in spite of the
overwhelming evidence to the contrary from the water
masters and the water engineer, Mr. Towler, and from
:Mr. Bagley who took the water right after Moyle's turn
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ended, and in the face of the indisputable fact that the
Company so distributed the water of the ditch that the
water actually ran through the North Branch divide
for the Moyle place the 13 hours or 26 hours in the turns
which represented Moyle's rights for irrigation as shown
by the water tickets (exhibits 4, 5, and 6). That water
just didn't come to the division box and stay there. It
kept running. It didn't go down to Bagley, the next
user, before his turn started. He went up and got
it at Moyle's place every turn and every time he found
it running into Moyle's place. That evidence stands absolutely uncontradicted except by Mr. Moyle's assertion
that he tried not to use the water and in his opinion
he did not use it. But he himself admits he used the
creek water in the months when no lake water was
commingled therewith.
In addition, Moyle himself testified that ''after
this condemnation suit the water master continued to
give me the water that was condemned." (Tr. P. 75) He
says, ''for some time after 1926 the watermaster didn't
recognize this condemnation because I had took it up
with them a lot of times and they finally did so; I say
I didn't know when they cut it down.'' He didn't have
any judgment as to approximately when they cut it
down; doesn't know whether it would be within a year
or two years or three years, or what after the condemnation. (Tr. P. 77) He could not estimate how
,many hours the water would run on the land or whether
it was in the day time. He had a boy there. (Tr. 96) After an extensive cross examination he finally admitted
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he had no idea how long the water wa8 allowed to run
on hi~ hmne place or whether it was in the day timP,
because he didn't do the irrigating; he had a boy there
to do it.
The water to which :Moyle was entitled under his
shares of stoek. by his own letter, Exhibit 8, had always
been used fron1 the ~lain and South Bra11ches by Pete
Riva, and were to continue to be so used so he did not use
that water on his home place nor did he have anything
to do with the use of that water. When he says he let
the water run \vhen it was clear creek water until the
next man came for it he could not be referring to the
water Pete Riva was using on the ten and five acre
tracts. He must have had reference to the use of water
on his home tract.
We refer the Court again to the undisputed testimony of Bagley, the water user who took the North
Branch water after Moyle's turn. On each turn for
eight years he had to go to Moyle's place to get his
water and every time he found it still running into
Moyle's place when his turn began. The Company always
had water in sufficient quantity to supply Moyle his
full water rights. This water was ticketed to him in
regular turns and the water was actually flowing in
the ditch and through the divide into the North Branch
at Moyle's place and was there interrupted by some
one and turned into Moyle's property for it was not
allowed to run on down to Bagley's place until he came
up and took it.
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III
GROUND 6
The opinion makes much of the point that as soon
as the order for possession was granted it was Moyle's
duty not to use the water represented by the 223,4 shares.
Of course, he would have had no right to take such
water away from the City, if the City insisted on using
it. But it should be remembered that the distribution
system was such that there was no way for Moyle
to receive and take creek water except such as flowed
past the Cit)''s intake up the canyon. Any creek water
which flowed past the intake was not held by the City
under the order of possession. In all of the years 1927,
1928, 1929, nothing but creek water flowed in. the Tanner Ditch, and in addition, culinary water was furnished
through the pipe system. As already shown, clear creek
water flowed in the Tanner Ditch during all of April,
May, and June, and parts of July, August, September,
and October of every year except 1936, when for a short
period in the fail only lake water flowed in the Ditch.
The period of April, May and June is the high water
period when there is more water than all rights combined
can use. If the condemnor voluntarily relinquishes possession of all or a part of the property there is then
no duty resting upon the condemnee to refrain from
using it. Just the reverse, it is his duty to use it and
thus mitigate the damages he would otherwise suffer.
This principle is admitted by plaintiff themselves. Counsel stated to the Trial Court (Tr. P. 316) with reference
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to the Inateriality of evidence showing use by Moyle
of the water involved:
·' \Y e could hardly claim damages for it (the
water) if we used it at least to the extent that
it would Initigate the dmnage, that would be
competent evidence. "\Ve claim we have not used
it at all, not a drop."
In 18 ~-\.n1. J ur. p 903 Sec. 262, Eminent DoInain, is the following:
"It is the duty of the owner, so far as reasonably possible, to attempt to minimize his damages by salvaging what he can from the property
taken. Thus, where growing crops are destroyed,
it is his duty, if he has the opportunity, to care
for such perishable property. So also, it is his
duty to use all reasonable exertion to protect himself, and avert, as far as practicable, the injuriou~
consequences of the taking.''

ENID and A. RY. CO. vs. WILEY-Okla.,- 78
P. 96. In this case the Railroad sought to condemn a
right of way. Appraisers were appointed and fixed the
damage at $600.00. That amount was deposited, hut the
land owner refused to accept it and demanded a jury
trial. Pending these procedings, the Cmnpany entered
the land and excavated for its roadbed and disfigured
about sixteen acres. It then obtain other land and dismissed the proceedings. The land owner then instituted
an action for damages. The Court says:
''We do not think the value of the land
sought to be taken and upon which the injuries
are committed should be the test of the limit of
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recovery. This rule may well be applied where
land is actually taken. The measure of damages
as stated in Sedgwick on Damages, Sec. 939 (8
Ed.), is the cost of restoring the land to its forIner condition, with compensation for loss of it,
if this all together is less than the diminution in
value of the land with the injuries left standing.
This is on the principle that, if the cost of repairing the injuries is greater than the diminution in
market value of the land, the latter is the true
measure of damages; the rule of avoidable consequences requiring that in such case the plaintiff shall diminish the loss as much as possible.''

In DES MOINES WET WASH LAUNDRY vs.
DES JJ10INES,-Iowa-, 198 N.\V. 486, 34 A. L. R. 1517,
the City sought to condemn a tract on which was a building leased and used by the plaintiff as a laundry. On
mitigation of damages the Court says:
"Plaintiff's lease hold was commandeered
and the obligation was upon plaintiff to minimize the consequent damage. One way of doing
this, and which was done, was to secure other
quarters.''
The order for possession reads as follows:
"That Salt Lake City, plaintiff herein, is
hereby authorized to take all the water of Big
Cottonwood Creek now flowing in Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and to turn into said Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch other water suitable
for irrigation in lieu and place of the Big Cottonwood Creek water so taken therefrom by
plaintiff, and it is further ordered that as soon
as possible plaintiff shall in water pipe furnish
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to and n1ake available to defendants for domestic
and culinary purposes sufficient creek water in
Big Cottonwood Creek.''
Certainly it was :Moyle's duty to use the water thus
to be n1ade available to him pending the final disposition of the case and thus keep his damages at a minimum.
If the water so furnished did not equal in rental value
the water taken, it nevertheless had some value whether
used by :Moyle himself or rented by him and Moyle could
not wilfully and stubbornly refuse to use or accept
of it. If he could have rented or sold the water taken
by the City, he also could have rented or sold the water
which the order obligated the City to furnish and which
all of the evidence shows was actually furnished. Mr.
Towler testified that the water furnished under the exchange agreement to stockholders, which was the same
kind of water which was made available to Moyle, was
worth twice as much both in rental and sale value as
was the water Moyle claims the City took (Tr. P. 307)
The fact is, as we have demonstrated, Moyle did use
the water, both that which flowed in the Tanner Ditch
and that which was piped to his place, and he built a
spacious home so he could use the water so delivered
under pressure.
Further, the order did not require the City to at
all times take all of the creek water to which the Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch was entitled. The City was
simply authorized to take and to replace what it took
with other irrigation water, and was also required to
furnish domestic and culinary water in the pipe system
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sufficient for Moyle's needs which would be almost without limitation. The City could have refrained from taking
any water under this order or it could take such part
as it needed, furnishing other irrigation water in lieu
thereof, but being obligated to furnish creek water in
pipes s11fficient for !foyle's culinary and domestic use.
The opinion Inakes the point that the commingling
of creek and lake water was a taking pro tanto. While
we seriously question this proposition, as we shall later
develop, if it is a taking pro tanto it is not a complete
taking and credit should have been given for the value
of that which was not taken.

IV
GROUND 7
The decision both of the trial court and this court
is based on a taking of Moyle's water by the City under
an order for possession granted in condemnation proceedings. That order of possession was dismissed Jannary 7, 1938, when the entire proceeding was dismissed.
The order of dismissal states:
''The court having sustained the demurrer
imposed by the defendant in the above entitled
case and the attorneys for plaintiff having stated
in open court that they did not desire to amend
their complaint but chose to stand on the complaint without amendment it is therefore ordered that the above entitled case be and the
same here by is dismissed. ' '
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There was nothing surreptitious about such disInissal. The defendants in that case, the plaintiffs here,
interposed the demurrer and they knew it had been sustained, and they also knew that the City would either
have to amend or stand a dismissal. If 1\foyles had any
interest whatever in the case they would have been
fully advised of the dismissal. It was in the recordthe decision not to amend was made in open Court.
Furthermore, the City had a right to dismiss the case
at any time on its own motion. The implication that the
City sneaked over a dismissal to the prejudice of the
~Ioyles, keeping the fact a dark secret, is wholly unfair
and without foundation.
After the dismissal the City was not holding Moyle's
water under the order for possession. The year 1938
was one of the years ~Ioyle told the water master not to
give him turns for these 2234 shares and the water
represented by those shares, according to the Court's
own opinion, was used by other stock holders and hence
was not used by the City. In 1939 the water was again
ticketed to :Moyle just the same as it had always been
even before the order for possession was granted. There
apparently was no taking of Moyle's water between
1921 and 1926 before the order for possession was entered, although the exchange agreement had been in
effect during that time and the lake water had been
commingled with the creek water, as his complaint is
based entirely upon a taking under the order and a
failure to return the water after its dismissal. If Moyle
was ticketed and had available to him in 1939 and since
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the water to which he was entitled in the same manner as
before 1926, then there must have been a return to him
of his water. And the record is conclusive that this is
what happened. After the order was dismissed the City
was not taking as a condemnor-if it took any water it
took it as a trespasser and it could only be liable for
that water which it actually took. The clear water was
in the ditch in 1939 during April, May, June and until
July 10. F,rom July 10 to October 15th, Lake water was
added. (Tr. P. 272) Moyles then knew the order was
dismissed for on April 17, 1939, they filed their claim
for damages reciting the fact of dismissal. Clearly
then, for the years 1938 and 1939 plaintiffs were not
entitled to a judgment based upon a taking by the City
of all their water rights under these 22% shares.
In addition to giving plaintiffs the full rental value
of the 223;4 shares based upon l\ioyle 's testimony of value
for the year 1938 and 1939, the Court also gave judgment based upon that same estimate of value for the
time intervening between the filing of the action and
the time of judgment, a period of over a year, awarding the sum of $350.00. This was done without the filing
of any supplemental pleadings or any amendment to
the complaint. We submit that such an award was gross
error.
17 C.J. p 1000, Section 303:
The assessment of damages is usually
governed by the situation or condition of affairs
existing at the time the action is brough; hence
for a recovery of loss or damages occurring
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thereafter, plaintiffs should amend or file a
supplemental petition.''
17 C.J. p 1085, Section 395 :
''As a general rule, damages are to be
assessed as of the date at which action is brought,
and only such damages as have then accrued may
be awarded either in actions of contract or of
tort. Plaintiff can recover only for such damages
as are the consequences of what defendant did
before action was brought. Damages which have
accrued after the action is begun may be allowed
where they are the consequence of acts done
before the beginning of the action and constitute
a part of the cause of action declared on.''
See also 25 C.J.S. p 751, Section 130 (c), and p
907, Section 193.
There is another feature to this question. The opinion states that the commingling of lake and creek water
was a taking by the City pro tanto. The fact is that
the City's intake is high up in the Canyon and the creek
water that flows past its intake continues on down the
creek to a point at the head of the Tanner Ditch where
the ditch's portion of the creek flow is received. It is
at this last point that the lake water is emptied into the
Tanner Ditch from the city's pumping plant under
the exchange agreement, and it is here and by virtue of
that agreement that the commingling takes place. Under
these conditions can it be said that the City is the one
that has taken the water pro tanto or any creek water?
Is it to be charged with the trespass~· The Ditch Company is the distributing agency whose duty it is to
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see that the water users on the Ditch get the water
they are entitled to, not the City.
It is undoubtedly Moyle's position that no return
of his water can ever take place until either the exchange agreement is abrogated so creek water will always flow down to his place in the Tanner Ditch uncommingled with lake water or a separate conduit is
provided him to carry his portion of the creek water
to him. And such conduit could only be a pipe line, for
no open channel would carry that quantity of water
and in the turns of use which he is required to take
without substantial loss. But Moyle, as a stock holder in
the Company, can also insist that the exchange agreement be complied with-that the City furnish the lake
water in amounts sufficient to make up the quantity
agreed to be delivered by the City. Under the ruling of
this court in Etast Mill Or.e1ek mater Oom'Pany vs. Salt
Lake O~ty,. .. -------~-------------Utah ________________________ , 159 P. 2d. 863,
he, as a stock holder, is a beneficiary under such agreement, entitled to bring an action to compel performance.
The effect of the Court's decision therefore is to place
the City in the position of a trespasser if it complies
with the agreement giving Moyle a right to recover
damages for such trespass, while on the other hand
if the City fails to comply with the agreement it may
be compelled by Moyle as a beneficiary thereunder to
make performance.
The Court allows no diminution of damages in the
trespass action for the water made available to Moyle.
If, from a legal standpoint, the exchange agreement is
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impossible of performance without depriving Moyle of
his water rights, should the burden of paying the resulting damages fall upon the City as if it were, the
culpable party to the contract .that brought about and
was responsible for the unavoidable effects of the contract? The commingling of lake water with the creek
water is not the act of the City. The City merely delivers the lake water to the Company at a point designated by the Company. Moyle commenced an action
against the Company in 1922; the files being in evidence
as exhibit G, to enjoin the delivery of creek water by
the Company to the City as being ultra vires and that
action is still pending. He was ordered to make the
City a party, but he has never done so in the twentyfour years that have since elapsed.
In 1920, after the exchange agreement was entered
into, the City filed an appiication with the State Engineer to change the point of diversion from the head
of the Tanner Ditch to the head of the City conduit
farther up the Canyon so it could take the creek water
at its conduit. A certified copy of that application together with the action taken by the State Engineer is
in evidence as exhibit 3. This exhibit shows that notice
of hearing on said application was published in the
Deseret News from April 19 to May 19, 1920; but no
protests of any kind, not even by Moyle, was filed. That
the application was granted September 3, 1920. Moyle
must be held to have had notice under the statute. Furthermore he well knew that if the application was
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fective and that the inevitable consequence would be
that lake water would be delivered to the Company as
provided for in the exchange agreement. Not withstanding this knowledge, he filed no protest nor did he appeal
from the decision of the State Engineer. He has permitted his action to enjoin the Company from performing under said agreement to lie dormant for 24 years.
In addition he has used the water pipe system which
was installed under the exchange agreement and has
received the benefits of such system delivering water
under pressure and thus~ eliminating taking water for
culinary and domestic purposes from an open ditch. We
submit that under such facts and conditions, the plaintiffs are now estopped from taking a position that places
the City in the position of a trespasser in the performance of the exchange agreement. He must now be held
to have acquiesced in any change thus brought about to
his water right. He has not been deprived of water suitable for any of the purposes to which he had been using
it. He has been receiving or has had made available to
him all the water that he was entitled to use either for
irrigation or for culinary and domestic purposes.

v
GROUNDS 9, 10, and 11
The grounds for rehearing relied on in this group
relate to the fundamental error in the decision arising
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from the failure to keep in 1nind the nature of the property right inYolved, and consequently the correct measure of damages which should be applied. Since these
n1atters are so ably and exhaustively covered by Justice
'Volfe in his dissenting opinion, we incorporate that
opinion as a part hereof. We desire only to add the
following observations.
This case is unlike the Shurtliff and Sigurd cases
in that here there is no permanent taking of the water,
whereas in those cases the taking was permanent and
the owner of the water right lost the right in its entirety.
Here there is only a temporary interference with the
right to use water. Surely in such a situation the owner's damages should be measured by the use which he
lost. He should not be permitted to be enriched by a
value based upon a possible use which could only result
· from a permanent taking. The right which Moyle had was
to take a certain amount of water from the Tanner Ditch;
he could not have sold or leased anything else. It was that
right which was interferred with, and he lost only what

that right would have meant to him~~~ch interference.
The value of that right cannot be predi&ed upon a possible use which could be made if the taking were permanent, nor is the value to be found by considering that the
water might have been put in pipes or reservoirs or that
it could have been taken out at some other point of
diversion where it could be put under pressure and used
entirely for culinary and domestic use.
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VI
GROUND 12
As we have already pointed out, the record is conclusive that plaintiffs in fact have received all of the
Big Cottonwood Creek water to which they were entitled under their 22% shares for culinary and domestic
purposes through the pipe system installed under the
exchange agreement. This being a fact, the judgment of
the Trial Court should be reversed because it fails to
diminish the amount of damages by the reasonable rental
value of the water so delivered.
VII
GROUND 13
The opinion entirely ignores the assignment of error
which relate to the action of the Trial Court in entering judgment for the return to Moyle of 22%, shares of
water right in the Big Cottonwood Stream and in decreeing that plaintiffs' water rights were the same water
as that decreed to Oscar W. Moyle in the Progress case
and the Big Oott'owwo10d Tanner Ditch Company vs.
Shurtliff case, and decreeing that the plaintiff should
recover from defendant the use and possession from
the water of Big Cottonwood Stream described as 223_4
shares water right in said stream. In the first place,
such a decree was entirely unnecessary to a disposition
of the issues presented by the pleadings. In the second
place, the evidence is conclusive that the 223_4 shares
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were shares in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and
not in the Big Cottonwood Strean1. It is true the water
of the Tanner Ditch came from the Big Cottonwood
Stream, but :Jioyle ·s shares represent a certain portion
of the Tanner Ditch Company's right and not a certain
proportion of the Big Cottonwood Stream as a whole.
The drcree is therefore misleading in describing a water
right in the ~Ioyles which they do not own and in decreeing that the City return a water right which is impossible to define and to which the plaintiffs are not
entitled.
In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit
that this petition for rehearing should be granted and
the cause set for rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRISTENSEN
City Attorney,
HOMER HOLMGREN,
A. P. KESLER
Assistant City Attorneys,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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